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PENNSYLVANIA'S SELF-EXECUTING
ENVIRONMENTAL AMENDMENT:
A VIEW OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG
The environmental amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution,
article I, section 27, passed by the General Assembly and ratified by
the voters on May 18, 1971, provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values
of the environment. Penns) Ivania's public natural resources are
the common property of all the people, including generations
yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth
shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the
people.,
Shortly after passage of the amendment, the Commonwealth
sought a permanent injunction to prevent construction of a pro-
posed 307-foot observation tower near the Gettysburg Battlefield, -
alleging that the tower would despoil Gettysburg's "natural and
historic" environment in violation of the amendment.3 After making
detailed findings concerning the location and characteristics of the
tower and the adjacent park, the chancellor concluded that the
amendment was self-executing4 as it provided a sufficient rule by
1. PA. CONST. art. 1, 27.
2. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 13 Adams
Co. L.J. 75 (C.P. 1971), aff'd, 8 Pa. Commw. 231, 302 A.2d 886, aff'd, 454
Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973):
[TJhc proposed tower is a metal structure rising over 300 feet above the
ground. It is shaped like an hourglass: about 100 feet in diameter at the
bottom, 30 feet in the middle and 70 feet at the top. The top level will
include an observation deck, elevator housings, facilities for warning approach-
ing aircraft and an illuminated American flag. The proposed site of the tower
is an area near which the third day of the battle of Gettysburg was fought.
The site is immediately south of the Gettysburg National Cemetery.
454 Pa. at ............, 311 A.2d at 597 (Jones, C.J., & Eagan, J., dissenting).
3. "[In the words of one critic: 'itlhe tower as proposed . ..would disrupt
the skyline, dominate the setting from many angles, and still further erode the
natural beauty and setting which was once marked by the awful conflict of a
brothers' war.'" Id. at ............, 311 A.2d at 590 (quoting testimony of Dr.
Milton E. Flowers, Professor of Political Science, Dickinson College; Member
Board of Directors, Cumberland County Historical Society).
4. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 13 Adams
Co. L.J. 75, 80 (C.P. 1971).
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which the right given might be enjoyed and the duty imposed en-
forced. He found, however, that the Commonwealth had failed to
show by clear and convincing proof that the tower would injure the
"natural, scenic, historic, or aesthetic values" of Gettysburg.
In Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Tower, Inc.0 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the factual findings oi the
chancellor but did not conclude whether the amendment was self-
executing.7 The issue presented to the supreme court in Gettysburg
Tower was whether the environmental amendment is "intended
only to espouse a policy undisposed to enforcement without sup-
plementing legislation," or whether the amendment, in effect, es-
tablished "the common law public trust doctrines as a constitutional
right to environmental protection susceptible to enforcement by an
action in equity."
In support of the contention that the amendment is self-executing,
the Commonwealth argued that its provisions are part of article I,
which is entitled "Declaration of Rights," and that no section of
article I had been judicially declared not to be self-executing?10 The
5. Id. at 86-87.
6. 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973).
7. Three opinions were filed with two justices joining in each: the opinion of
the court (plurality opinion), a concurrence, and a dissent. The remaining justice
concurred only in the result.
8. A public trust is defined as a right of property, real or personal, held by
one party for the benefit of the public at large or of some considerable portion
thereof. Goodwin v. McMinn, 193 Pa. 646, 44 A. 1094 (1899); accord, Boyce
v. Mosely, 102 S.C. 361, 86 S.E. 771 (1915); see Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1
(1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). Public trusts and
charitable trusts may be considered synonymous expressions. Bauer v. Meyers,
244 F. 902, 911 (8th Cir. 1917). Public and charitable trusts differ from private
trusts in that their beneficiaries are uncertain and their duration is or may be
perpetual. Id. at 912. For purposes of this Comment, the corpus of the public's
trust comprises certain natural resources and the scenic, natural, historic, and
aesthetic values of the environment entrusted to a sovereign or state for the benefit
of its subjects or people. See also Note, The Public Trust in Public Waterways,
7 URBAN L. ANN. 219 (1974).
9. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa.
193 ............, 311 A.2d 588, 596 (1973) (Jones, C.J., & Eagan, J., dissenting).
The four members of the court who expressed views on the self-execution question
were equally divided. The remaining three justices expressed no opinion on this
question but supported affirmance on other grounds. See Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa.
Commw. 14, 28 n.2, 312 A.2d 86, 94 n.2 (1973).
10. 454 Pa. at ............, 311 A.2d at 591. The general principles of law applied
in determining whether a particular provision of a constitution is self-executing
are discussed at length in O'Neill v. White, 343 Pa. 96, 22 A.2d 25 (1941):
A Constitution is primarily a declaration of principles of the fundamental
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court noted that, unlike the first twenty-six sections of article I, the
twenty-seventh was more than a mere limitation on the powers of
government., The first sentence, which states that "[t]he people have
a right to dean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment,"' 2
can be interpreted to limit governmental interference with the
people's right to preservation and maintenance of the Common-
wealth's public natural resources. Hence, the first part of section
27, standing alone, could be read as self-executing. 3 The court,
however, found that the remaining provisions of section 27 expand
rather than limit the powers of government:
These provisions declare that the Commonwealth is the "trustee"
of Pennsylvania's "public natural resources" and they give the
Commonwealth the power to act "to conserve and maintain them
for the benefit of all the people." Insofar as the Commonwealth
always had a recognized police power to regulate the use of land,
and thus could establish standards for dean air and clean water
consistent with the requirements of public health, § 27 is merely
a general reaffirmation of past law.-
Finally, the court rejected the Commonwealth's argument because
the Commonwealth failed to cite any instance in which a constitu-
tional provision expanding the powers of government was found to
be self-executing. 5
The Commonwealth's second argument for a self-executing con-
struction contrasted the environmental protection amendment's pro-
law. Its provisions are usually only commands to the legislature to enact
laws to carry out the purposes of the framers of the Constitution, or mere
restrictions upon the power of the legislature to pass laws, yet it is entirely
within the power of those who establish and adopt the Constitution to make
any of its provisions self-executing.
Id. at 99-100, 22 A.2d at 26-27, quoting 6 R.C.L. § 52, at 57. A constitutional
provision, complete in itself, needs no further legislation to put it in into force.
Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing only so far as it is susceptible
of execution. Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403 (1900); T. CooLEY, CONsTI-
TUTIONAL LLTrrATIONS 165 (8th ed. W. Carrington 1927).
11. 454 Pa. at ............, 311 A.2d at 592.
12. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
13. 454 Pa. at ............, 311 A.2d at 592.
14. Id.
15. Id.
1975]
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visions with similar provisions enacted in Massachusetts,"0 Illinois,17
New York,'8 and Virginia. 9 The Commonwealth emphasized that
16. The People shall have a right to clean air, pure water, freedom from
excessive and unnecessary noise and the scenic, historic, and aesthetic qualities
of their environment and the protection of the people in their rights to conser-
vation, development and utilization of the agricultural, mineral, forest, water,
air, and other natural resources is hereby declared to be a public purpose.
The general court [legislature] shall have the power to enact legislation neces-
sary or expedient to protect such right ...
Mass. H.B. 3875. A majority of the members of the Senate and House of
Representatives adopted the bill in joint session, August 5, 1969.
17. § 1. Public Policy-Legislative Responsibility
The public policy of the State and the duty of each person is to provide
and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and future
generations. The General Assembly shall provide for the implementation and
enforcement of this public policy.
§ 2. Rights of Individuals
Each person has a right to a healthful environment. Each person may
enforce this right against any party, governmental or private, through ap-
propriate legal proceedings subject to reasonable limitation as the General
Assembly may provide by law.
ILL. CONST. art. XI §§ 1-2.
Article XI, section 1 of the Illinois Constitution expresses a public policy
that requires implementation and enforcement by the General Assembly. In
stating that it is "[t]he public policy of the State and duty of each person . . .
[to] maintain a healthful environment . . . ," the drafters of the constitution
apparently intended to create an environmental right that would give citizens
standing to challenge any governmental act-and conceivably any private act-
that degrades the quality of the environment. 6 TH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, GENERAL GOV'T CoI.,aM. Proposal No. 16, at 5 (July 1, 1970). The
enunciation of this right, however, is coupled with an explicit declaration of a
person's standing to enforce the right. Hence, it is not clear what legal effect
the Illinois drafters might have thought the statement of right, standing by
itself, would have had. See Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58
VA. L. REV. 193, 197 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Howard].
18. The policy of the state shall be to conserve and protect its natural re-
sources and scenic beauty and encourage the development and improvement
of its agricultural lands for the production of food and other agricultural
products. The legislature, in implementing this policy, shall include adequate
provision for the abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive and
unnecessary noise, the protection of agricultural lands, wetlands and shore-
lines, and the development and regulation of water resources. The legislature
shall further provide for the acquisition of lands and waters, including im-
provements thereon and any interest therein, . . . which because of their
natural beauty, wilderness character, or geological, ecological or historical
significance, shall be preserved and administered for the use and enjoyment of
the people. Properties so dedicated shall constitute the state nature and his-
torical preserve and they shall not be taken or otherwise disposed of except
by law enacted by two successive . . . sessions of the legislature.
N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4.
This provision of the New York Constitution imposes a restraint on the dis-
position of public trust property. Such restraints on legislative power lend them-
selves to judicial enforcement because they are as susceptible to judicial application
as any other constitutional restraint. Enforcement is even easier when the re-
[Vol. 9:245
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Pennsylvania's amendment is the only one that does not specifically
provide for legislative implementation. 20  Rejecting this argument,
straint on legislative power provides some explicit standard-in this case action
by two successive regular sessions of the legislature. See Howard, supra note 17,
at 202.
19. § 1. Natural resources and historical sites of the Commonwealth.-To the
end that the people have clean air, pure water, and the use and enjoyment
for recreation of adequate public lands, waters, and other natural resources,
it shall be the policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, develop, and utilize
its natural resources, its public lands, and its historical sites and buildings.
Further, it shall be the Commonwealth's policy to protect its atmosphere,
lands, and waters from pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the benefit,
enjoyment, and general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth.
§ 2. Conservation and development of natural resources and historical sites.-
In the furtherance of such policy, the General Assembly may undertake the
conservation, development, or utilization of lands or natural resources of the
Commonwealth, the acquisition and protection of historical sites and build-
ings, and the protection of its atmosphere, lands, and waters from pollution,
impairment, or destruction, by agencies of the Commonwealth or by the
creation of public authorities, or by leases or other contracts with agencies
of the United States, with other states, with units of government in the Com-
monwealth, or with private persons or corporations. Notwithstanding the time
limitations of the provisions of Article X, Section 7, of this Constitution, the
Commonwealth may participate for any period of years in the cost of projects
which shall be the subject of a joint undertaking between the Commonwealth
and any agency of the United States or of other states.
VA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2.
For a discussion of the thesis that Article XI of the revised Virginia Con-
stitution is more than an exhortation of public policy and constitutes an affirma-
tive mandate to state and local agencies to consider the environmental effects
of all their decisions see Howard, supra note 17, at 208:
As a formal statement of the public policy . . . , section 1 of article XI
requires no implementing legislation. . . . Section l's self-executing quality
is recognized by section 2 which, in authorizing the Assembly to act, says
that legislation is to be "in the furtherance of such policy"-policy already
in existence by virtue of section 1. An enunciation of public policy, unlike a
rule of conduct laid down by legislation, is not aimed at the private citizen
and imposes no duty on him. Rather, it is a mandate for and a restraint
on governmental activity. Section 1 of article XI is, thus, self-executing not
with regard to the public at large but with regard to those entities which
are constitutionally bound by public policy, namely the government, its courts,
and its agencies. In addition, article XI is not self-executing with respect
to obligating the General Assembly to enact environmental legislation.
(Footnotes omitted.)
Unlike article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, article XI,
sections 1 and 2 of the Virginia Constitution, do not make explicit reference
to the public trust doctrine nor do they specifically create a public right to
environmental protection. No Virginia court has yet ruled on the question
whether article XI creates substantive rights enforceable by private individuals.
See River v. Richmond Metropolitan Authority, 359 F. Supp. 611, 623 (E.D.
Va. 1973), in which a federal district court refused to exercise pendent juris-
diction over a claim that alleged violation of article XI of the Virginia Consti-
tution.
20. The highest courts of Illinois and Virginia have not ruled on the self-
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the court found it of greater significance that those states recognized
the necessity for legislative implementation before a new, constitu-
tionally created governmental power could be exercised.21,
Having thus disposed of the Commonwealth's arguments, the court
discussed further objections to enforcing the provisions of the amend-
ment without additional legislation. The court considered possible
due process and equal protection objections should the governor
single out alleged violators of the public trust who were without
notice that their conduct might lead to prosecution. "[A] properLy
owner would not know and would have no way, short of expensive
litigation, of finding out what he could do with his property." 2 '
Should an owner contemplate a use similar to others who were not
enjoined under the public trust doctrine, no guarantee would exist
that the Commonwealth would not seek to enjoin his use. Accord-
ingly, the court would require the Pennsylvania General Assembly
to set standards and procedures for executive action.23
The dissenting justices, maintaining that section 27 is self-execut-
ing, would have enjoined construction of the proposed tower.24
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the appellee-land
owners, they concluded that the proposed structure would un-
doubtedly do violence to the "natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values" of Gettysburg. The dissent argued that "[a]s part of the
declaration of rights embraced by Article I, the amendment confers
certain enumerated rights upon the people of the Commonwealth
and imposes upon the executive branch a fiduciary obligation to
protect and enforce those rights."2s Focusing on the language of the
amendment, the dissenters declared that it creates a public trust:
The "natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic [sic] values of the
environment" are the trust res; the Commonwealth, through its
execution question. See notes 17 & 19 supra. See generally T. COOLEY, supra
note 10; Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time,
54 VA. L. REv. 928 (1968); HOWARD, supra note 17.
Additional states have recently added environmental provisions to their con-
stitutions or adopted amendments thereto. See FLA. CoNsT. art II, § 7; Miaui.
CoNsT. art IV, § 52; R.I. CONST. art I, § 17.
21. 454 Pa. at ............, 311 A 2d at 594. See notes 17-19 supra. Both the
Commonwealth's argument and the court's finding proceed from unsupported
assertions.
22. 454 Pa. at ............, 311 A.2d at 593.
23. Id. at ............,311 A 2d at 594.
24. Id. at ............, 311 A.2d at 599 (Jones, C.J., & Eagan, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at ............. 311 A2d at 596.
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executive branch, is the trustee; the people of this Common-
wealth are the trust beneficiaries. The amendment thus installs
the common law public trust doctrine as a constitutional right
to environmental protection susceptible to enforcement by an
action in equity.26
The dissent found no merit in the court's reliance on constitutional
amendments of other states,27 which contain obvious textual differ-
ences from the Pennsylvania amendment.28  Moreover, the dissent
undoubtedly perceived that prior to the amendment the General
Assembly had the power to abrogate the common law public trust
doctrine. Thus the dissent's construction of the amendment would
effectively withdraw the General Assembly's power to act in dero-
gation of the common law public trust doctrine.
The dissent next faced what it believed to be the ultimate issue:
whether the proposed tower "violate[d] the rights of the people of
the Commonwealth as secured by the amendment."2 9 Reviewing
the chancellor's conclusions of fact, 30 the dissent was convinced by
the testimony of the Commonwealth's expert witnesses that the pro-
posed tower would do violence to the Gettsyburg environment.2 1
The concurring opinion pointed out that the Commonwealth has
always had the authority to proceed, either as parens patriae at com-
mon law or as trustee of the state's public resources, to protect the
26. Id.
27. See notes 16-21 and accompanying text supra.
28. 454 Pa. at ............... 311 A.2d at 597 (Jones, C.J., & Eagan, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
30. The dissent believed that application of the "abuse of discretion" standard
for review of a trial court's findings of fact was inappropriate and drew their
own inferences. Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania "has held on numerous
occasions that, although a chancellor's findings of fact have the force and effect
of a jury's verdict, the chancellor's conclusions of ultimate fact are reviewable."
Id., citing Shapiro v. Shapiro, 424 Pa. 120, 224 A.2d 164 (1966); Chambers v.
Chambers, 406 Pa. 50, 176 A.2d 673 (1962); Sechler v. Sechler, 403 Pa. 1,
169 A.2d 78 (1961); Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Szabo, 391 Pa. 272, 138 A.2d
85 (1958); Peters v. Mfachikas, 378 Pa. 52, 105 A.2d 708 (1954).
31. The Commonwealth presented testimony by George Hartzog, Director of
the National Park Service, who appeared in place of the United States Secretary
of the Interior, Robert Garvey, Executive Secretary of the President's Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation, Louis Kahn, a distinguished architect and
Professor of Architecture at the University of Pennsylvania, Vincent Kling, a
noted Philadelphia architect, and Bruce Catton, Pulitzer prize-winning Civil War
historian, among others. 454 Pa. at ............ , 311 A.2d at 597-99 (Jones, C.J.,
& Eagan, J., dissenting).
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interests of its citizens.32 The Commonwealth, as sovereign, has an
interest in all earth and air within its boundaries.33 The sovereign's
interest underlies and is. independent of that of its citizens. 4 This
interest, not based on the police power, allows for protection of
"parklands and historical sites" 35 as the common property of the
citizenry. Morever, if the health and comfort of the state's inhabi-
tants are threatened, the state is the proper party to represent and
defend them.36 Therefore, the concurring justices did not decide
whether section 27 is self-executing. Nevertheless, the concurrence
agreed with the lower courts' conclusion that the Commonwealth
had "failed to establish its entitlement to equitable relief either
on common-law or constitutional . . . theories." 37 The concurrence
agreed that the case raised serious constitutional problems regard-
ing the propriety of granting relief absent "appropriate and articu-
lated substantive and procedural standards"' 8 for executive action.
Because a majority of the court failed to answer the self-execution
question, the intermediate commonwealth court's opinion, which did
32. Id. at ............, 311 A.2d at 595-96 (Roberts & Manderino, JJ., con-
curring).
33. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
34. Pennsylvania courts have taken inconsistent positions on whether land in
the Commonwealth is held allodially or tenurially. Compare Wallace v. Harm-
stad, 44 Pa. 492, 501 (1863), with Citizens' Electric Co. v. Susquehanna Boom
Co., 270 Pa. 517, 113 A. 559 (1921), and Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810).
See also Stuart v. Easton, 170 U.S. 383 (1898), aff'g 74 F. 854 (1896); PA.
STAT. ANN. 64 § 1 (1959). The concurrence's argument is based on the existence
of a common law public trust held by the Commonwealth. See, e.g., Citizens'
Electric Co. v. Susquehanna Boom Co., 270 Pa. 517, 113 A. 559 (1921); Black
v. American Int'l Corp., 264 Pa. 260, 107 A. 737 (1919); Freeland v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 197 Pa. 529 (1901); Palmer v. Farrell, 129 Pa. 162 (1889);
Pursell v. Stover, 110 Pa. 43 (1885). Common law public trust theory is based
on the concept of tenure, the Commonwealth having succeeded to the Crown's
proprietary rights as overlord. See Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196, 226
(1899); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894); Citizens' Electric Co. v.
Susquehanna Boom Co., 270 Pa. 517, 113 A. 559 (1921).
35. 454 Pa. at ............ 311 A.2d at 595 (Roberts & Manderino, JJ., con-
curring); see Snyder v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 125 Ohio St. 336, 339, 181
N.E. 483, 484 (1932).
36. 454 Pa. at ............, 311 A.2d at 595; accord, Missouri v. Illinois, 180
U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
37. 454 Pa. at ............, 311 A.2d at 596 (Roberts & Manderino, JJ., con-
curring).
38. Id.; see Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
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hold Section 27 to be self-executing39 remains authoritative Penn-
sylvania precedent on this point. Assuming, arguendo, that section
27 is self-executing, Gettysburg Tower raises several subsidiary ques-
tions regarding the amendment's effect. One such question is
whether the people, as beneficiaries of the public trust (as well as
the Commonwealth as trustee), have standing to sue pursuant to
the amendment's mandates.
The opinion of the common pleas court in Gettysburg Tower
expresses the common law rule that, absent statutory authority to
the contrary or a special interest of a private party, only the attor-
ney general has the power to enforce a public trust.40 A person
having no special interest in the performance of a public trust can-
not maintain a proceeding, by mandamus or otherwise, to compel
the attorney general to bring an action to enforce the trust.41 In
cases decided by the commonwealth court after Gettysburg Tower,
however, private parties alleging public trust infringements under
section 27 have maintained suit against state agencies without demon-
strating a special interest in enforcement of the trust.42 These cases
provide precedent for allowing all beneficiaries of the constitu-
tionally created public trust to sue a Commonwealth agency for
injury to "public natural resources" or "environmental values"
caused by the agency's breach of its fiduciary duty to conserve and
maintain these resources and values. This result is in line with
what appears to have been the intent of the drafters of the environ-
mental amendment.43
39. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa.
Commw, 231, 243, 302 A.2d 886, 892 (1973); cf. T. COOLEY, supra note
10, at 116 n.1. Notwithstanding the supreme court's plurality opinion, the
commonwealth court has cited its own Gettysburg Tower opinion in subsequent
decisi ns construing section 27. Bucks County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Commonwealth,
11 Pa. Commw. 487, 313 A.2d 185 (1973); Payne v, Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw.
14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973). The commonwealth court's self-executing construction
thus limits the high court's decision in Gettysburg Tower to its facts.
40. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 13 Adams
Co. L.J. 75, 80 (C.P. 1971). Suit may be brought by the attorney general
on his own initiative or it may be brought by him on the relation of a third
party. See Note, The Public Trust in Public Waterways, supra note 8, at 236-
37.
41. Ames v. Attorney General, 332 Mass. 246, 124 N.E.2d 511 (1955); see
A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRuSTs 2760 (1954).
42. Bucks County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, 11 Pa. Commw. 487,
313 A.2d 185 (1973); Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Conuw. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973).
43, See Broughton, The Proposed Pennsylvania Declaration of Environmental
Rights, Anaylsis of HB 958, 41 PA. B.A.Q. 421 (1970).
1975]
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Assuming that all beneficiaries of the public trust have standing
to seek relief, judicial intervention can only be effective if standards
and procedures are developed to give content to this constitutionally
protected right. The commonwealth court has held that section 27
was intended not only to affix a public trust concept to the manage-
ment of public natural resources but also to allow normal develop-
ment of private property in the state.' 4 Rather than no development,
the court's mandate calls for controlled development of natural
resources. In implementing its holding, the commonwealth court
has delineated the proper scope of judicial review for determining
what human activity impairs the "natural, scenic, historic and
esthetic values of the environment." The court has recognized:
"[D]ecision makers will be faced with the constant and difficult task
of weighing conflicting environmental and social concerns in arriving
at a course of action that will be expedient as well as reflective of
the high priority which constitutionally has been placed on the
conservation of our natural, scenic, esthetic and historical resources."4
To balance social and environmental concerns, the court has pro-
posed a threefold test:
1) Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and regu-
lations relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth's public
natural resources? 2) Does the record demonstrate a reasonable
effort to reduce the environmental incursion to a minimum?
3) Does the environmental harm which will result from the chal-
lenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the benefits derived
therefrom that to proceed further would be an abuse of discre-
tion?4 6
Because this test provides only general standards, an evaluation of
its efficacy must await judicial refinement.
Even if questions of standing and appropriate standards are judi-
cially resolved, the problem of allocating the trusteeship responsi-
bilities imposed by the amendment remains. It is elementary that
Pennsylvania administrative agencies, counties, and municipalities
may not subvert the intent of section 27. Must they, however, take
44. Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Conumw. 14, 29, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (1973).
45. Bucks County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, 11 Pa. Commnw. 487,
498-99, 313 A.2d 185, 191 (1973); Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 29, 312
A.2d 86, 94 (1973).
46. Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 29-30, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (1973).
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affirmative steps to implement the amendment? This question is
of special importance to governmental planners.
funicipalities and counties already have many planning respon-
sibilities. Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning
Code, 7 a county or municipal planning agency "shall at the request
of its governing body have the power and shall be required to ...
prepare a comprehensive plan... . Is Municipalities have the
power to adopt official maps,4 9 land development and subdivision
ordinances,-0 zoning ordinancesA' or planned residential development
ordinances52- Counties may also by reference adopt county sub-
division and land development, "  zoning,54 or planned unit resi-
dential development ordinances.5 5 In addition, the Sewage Facilities
Act5 6 requires every municipality to submit to the Department of
Environmental Resources of the Commonwealth an officially adopted
plan for sewage treatment.57 Imposition of a section 27 duty upon
counties and municipalities, however, would significantly expand
their planning responsibilities. Under the amendment, private par-
ties, the Commonwealth, and perhaps even state instrumentalities
or political subdivisions, would have standing to challenge municipal
or county action that is inconsistent with sewage facilities or com-
prehensive plans, or that fails to consider actual or potential injury
to the "public natural resources" or "environmental values" of the
Commonwealth.
47. PA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10101-11202 (1972).
48. Id. § 10209.1.
49. Id. § 10401.
50. Id. § 10501.
51. Id. § 10601.
52. Id. § 10702.
53. Id. § 10502 (Supp. 1973).
54. Id. § 10602.
55. Id. § 10702.
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 750.1-.15 (Supp. 1973).
57. Id. § 750.5(a) The Department is authorized to approve or disapprove
this plan or revisions thereto. Id. § 750.5(e). Except for the Department's
"veto power" over sewage facility plans, planning requirements in the Munici-
palities Planning Code and the Sewage Facilities Act are generally procedural
in nature and demand only that conformity be attempted between official plans
and ordinances adopted to implement these plans. See id. § 750.5(d)(7); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10402, 10503, 10606 (1972). Actual conformity between
plans and ordinances is not required unless the ordinance expressly commands
conformity. But see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10703 (1972).
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A similar situation would result from imposition of planning
duties upon Commonwealth administrative agencies. These duties
would certainly entail comprehensive environmental trusteeship. The
Department of Environmental Resources of Pennsylvania is primarily
responsible for conserving and maintaining the public natural re-
sources and environmental values of the Commonwealth." It has
the power and duty to adopt rules and regulations,6 to approve
facilities requiring Commonwealth permits,00 to abate nuisances, 1
and to prescribe penalties for violators of several Commonwealth
statutes.62 The Environmental Hearing Board of the Department
of Environmental Resources0 3 has construed section 27 to require
the Department to act affirmatively beyond statutory requirements
to protect the environment for the present and the future. The
Hearing Board further held that the amendment's concern with the
future demands careful and thorough planning today.04 Although
the Hearing Board has not required full-scale environmental impact
statements, such as those submitted under the federal National
Environmental Policy Act, 5 it has indicated that elements of these
statements would be helpful to the Department in fulfilling its role
as trustee.66 More specifically, the Hearing Board has held that
"any planning process that does not give serious consideration to
(a) alternative methods of using the resources in question, and
(b) alternative methods of attaining the objective sought by the
permit applicant, does not constitute an exercise of reasonable care."07
However vague its present guidelines may be, the Hearing Board
may well require the Department to meet its planning obligations
58. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 510-1 to -108 (Supp. 1974).
59. Id. §§ 510-20(b), (c), (f), (g) (power given to Environmental Quality
Board).
60. E.g., id. § 510-18 (power to issue waterworks permits).
61. Id. § 510-17.
62. See id. § 510-1.
63. Commonwealth v. Fox, Docket No. 73-078, PA. ENVIRONMENTAL HEAR-
ING BD. (June 12, 1973).
64. Id.
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35 (1970).
66. Commonwealth v. Fox, Docket No. 73-078, PA. ENVIRONMENTAL HEAR-
ING BD. 4 (June 12, 1973).
67. Id. at 5.
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by procedures similar to filing detailed environmental impact state-
ments.'
Analogous results may be found in future orders of the common-
wealth court directed at other state agencies. To fulfill their duties
under section 27, all Commonwealth agencies might require permit
or license applicants to collect the information necessary to assess
environmental impacts.0  'Whether this requirement would prove
too burdensome and costly for permit applicants is a practical
problem that must be considered by judicial bodies before reading
a planning requirement into the environmental amendment. If
impact statement costs become a significant percentage of total
project costs, environmental planning may succumb to competing
social and economic demands. High economic costs notwithstanding,
Commonwealth agencies have authority to order permit applicants
to meet reasonable information collection requirements.70 Such re-
quirements appear economically feasible and are necessary to effectu-
ate the mandates of the environmental amendment.
In conclusion, Gettysburg Tower leaves the meaning of article I,
section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution unclear. Until the
supreme court rules othenise, section 27 remains the only environ-
mental amendment to a state constitution that has been held self-
executing. The implications of this holding present both a challenge
and an opportunity for judicial ingenuity. Through creative con-
stitutional interpretation, the Pennsylvania courts can set a useful
example for "conserving and maintaining" the quality of the environ-
ment.
Bertram C. Frey
68 The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (c) (i)
(1970), requires that all agencies of the federal government must file a detailed
statement on the environmental impact of any proposed "major" federal action.
69. Bucks County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, 11 Pa. Commw. 487,
313 A.2d 185 (1973): Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 312 A.2d 86
(1973); Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa.
Cornmw. 231, 302 A.2d 886, aff'd, 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973). To
obtain permits under the Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-
.1001 (1964), and the Sewage Facilities Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 750.1-
.15 (Supp. 1973), for example, the Department of Environmental Resources
requires applicants to submit detailed technical information. To comply with
permit application regulations promulgated by the Department, applicants
usually must hire several engineers or environmental experts.
70. Cf. Commonwealth v. Fox, Docket No. 73-078, PA. ENVIRONMENTAL
HEARING BD. 4 (June 12, 1973).
19751
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol9/iss1/11
